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ABSTRACT
This  paper  not  only  considers  why  many  concentrated  ownership  structured  systems  and 
jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also 
explores why the traditional principal agency theory may no longer hold in many concentrated 
ownership structures.
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Why the Traditional Principal Agent Theory May No Longer Apply To 
Concentrated Ownership Systems and Structures
Marianne Ojo
A. Introduction
The lack of knowledge is certainly one of the biggest obstacles to advancement. To choose to ignore 
because of difficulties associated with change – whilst logical, constitutes an even greater challenge 
to progress. However, to choose to ignore, for no plausible reason at all, constitutes the greatest 
challenge in the path of progress. What constitutes the definition of progress may also be viewed 
from several perspectives. Whilst cost reductions enhance progress, failure to address risks which 
have  been  building  up,  may eventually  generate  problems  which  are  greater  than  the  initially 
perceived costs. Many decision making processes involve cost benefit analyses and whilst agency 
costs – particularly those attributed to monitoring, may, initially be greater, the eventual benefits 
will gradually exceed those costs.
The past three to four decades have witnessed waves of global changes in respect of globalisation, 
conglomeration,  improved  technology,  increased  competition,  as  well  as  a  rise  in  transactions 
involving complex derivatives and financial instruments in financial markets. Such global changes 
have necessitated huge shake-ups in various jurisdictions whose structures of financial regulation 
have evolved from that of functional regulation to unified and integrated structures. One typical 
example being the UK and German banking systems of regulation. Various jurisdictions, notably, 
within Scandinavian jurisdictions,  have also adopted unified structures  of  regulation and whilst 
other jurisdictions, are attempting to address the challenges attributed to cross sectional services 
risks,  such move has been difficult owing to the level, scope and size of embeddedness of such 
jurisdictions' financial and institutional structures in the existing systems of regulation. Whilst a 
„one-size-fits-all“ approach can certainly not address every jurisdiction's needs, the importance of 
Basel Committe rules and regulations as a means of ensuring a degree of consistency – as well as 
incorporating rules in relation to increased transparency and disclosure, cannot be over emphasised.
Risk, regulation and conglomeration have become so inter-woven owing to the evolving nature of 
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risks – particularly as a result of complex changes within the financial environment. Counter party 
credit risks, as well as other forms of risks, complex financial instruments, and increased shadow 
banking activities,  all  contributing to the problem of effectively monitoring and managing such 
risks.
With such changes taking place, and the financial environment constantly evolving, the need to 
effectively monitor and address such risks becomes all the more important in corporate governance 
structures and systems.
Sarker argues that ownership and control structures, as well as institutional set-ups in which such 
corporations  are  assimilated,  determine,  to  a  large  extent,  the  nature  of  corporate  govenance 
problems in business enterprises and corporations.1 In so doing, he distinguishes between the nature 
of agency problems which are peculiar to concentrated ownership and control and those which are 
synonymous  with  diffuse  ownership  structures.  With  diffuse  structures  or  dispersed  ownership 
structures,  „agency problems arise on account of shareholder manager conflicts“  -  such agency 
problems being referred to as Type 1 or vertical agency problems.2 The agency problem attributed 
to  dispersed ownership  is  also  principally regarded as  being  that  of  the  control  over  powerful 
management.
Contrastingly, „additional agency problems“ are considered to arise under concentrated ownership: 
namely, the control of dominant shareholders and their influence over management.3  According to 
Eun and Resnick,4 in many countries with concentrated ownership, conflicts of interest are greater 
between large controlling shareholders and small outside shareholders, than between managers and 
shareholders.  They  also  make  reference  to  studies  undertaken  by  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) which document „sharp differences between countries“ in respect of:
− Corporate Ownership Structures
− Depth and Breadth of Capital markets
− Access of firms to External Financing
− Dividend Policies
1 J Sarkar, Ownership and Corporate Govenance in Indian Firms at page 217
2 Ibid at page 220
3 J Odenius, „Germany's Corporate Govenance Reforms: Has the System Become Flexible Enough? IMF 2008 
WP/08/179 at page14 of 21
4 C S Eun and BG Resnick, International Financial Management Fifth Edition 2009 at page 81
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LLSV, are cited by Eun and Resnick as stating that „such differences can be explained largely by 
how well  investors  are  protected  by  law from expropriation  by  the  managers  and  controlling 
shareholders  of  firms.“  Furthermore,  they  highlight  observations  that  English  common  law 
countries,  such  as  Canada,  the  U.S  and the  U.K,  provide  the  strongest  form of  protection  for 
investors whilst French civil law countries such as Belgium, Italy, and Mexico, provide the weakest.
It is therefore interesting to note that  whilst there are conflicting views in respect of the degree of 
agency problems which arise under dispersed and concentrated ownership structures, it appears that 
additional or greater agency problems will eventually necessitate the need for greater monitoring. 
Ownership of shares definitely also has a role to play in ensuring greater monitoring – however 
where a more harmonious relationship exists between principal and agent – particularly based on 
trust and long term relationships, the principal may see no reason to undertake „unnecessary“ levels 
of  monitoring  –  which  may  be  considered  costly.  In  other  words,  the  traditional  professional 
business like principal-agent relationship is transformed over a long period of term during which 
the long term harmonious relationship is sustained. In this respect, the traditional principal agent 
relationship in concentrated ownership systems and structures, would exist not between dominant 
shareholders and the agent – rather between the agent and the minority shareholders. The minority 
shareholders, unfortunately, are unable to afford or commit  the same level of control or funds (as 
that available to dominant shareholders), necessary to monitor the agent.
B A Comparative Analysis Between Ownership Systems and Structures Operating in Selected 
Jurisdictions: The UK, Germany, India, the US and Japan.
This  section  considers  the  two  main  ownership  systems  and  structures  which  prevail  across 
jurisdictions, namely, dispersed ownership systems and concentrated ownership systems. In respect 
of the former, reference will be made to the U.K and the U.S whilst a consideration and analysis of 
concentrated ownership systems will consider such jurisdictions such as Germany India and Japan. 
From this broad categorisation into concentrated and dispersed ownership system and structures, a 
further distinction will be sought between developing concentrated ownership systems (India) and 
more developed concentrated ownership systems (Germany and Japan).
Whilst  it  is  argued  that  some  of  the  costs  and  benefits  resulting  from  the  presence  of  large 
shareholders (as illustrated in developed economies) could be as equally relevant in the context of 
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developing  countries,  certain  reasons  are  propounded  for  the  inability  to  simply  „extrapolate“ 
experiences of corporate governance in developed countries into developing countries:5
− Some of the institutional specificities of developing countries – such as a less developed 
capital market, less active takeover markets, absence of well developed managerial market, 
may impact costs and benefits of large shareholdings in countries uniquely;6
− Monitoring by large shareholders  in developing countries may not  be as effective as  in 
developed countries because of poor availability of information on performance parameters 
of firms – owing to inadequate disclosure standards and weak enforcment mechanisms, as 
well  as  opaqueness  associated  with  insider  ownership  and  concentrated  ownership 
structures.
C Concentrated and Dispersed Ownership Systems and Structures
Concentrated Ownership Structures
Germany
According to Jürgens and Rupp,7 Germany is often cited as a classical case of „non-shareholder 
value orientation“ whose production-oriented, long term, risk averse and consensus-driven values, 
have been constrasted often with the Anglo Saxon approach. In addition to management, insiders 
within the German system of corporate governance are highlighted to be large shareholders, lenders 
and labour.8
Forces  considered  to  be  currently  responsible  for  the  move  towards  a  „shareholder  value 
orientation“ are summarised as follows:9
− State measures to deregulate financial markets
− Pressure of managers of investment and pension funds (in particular from the U.S.A)
5 See J Sarkar, Ownership and Corporate Govenance in Indian Firms at page 223
6 See also J Sarkar & S Sarker, „Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: 
Evidence from India“ International Review of Finance (2000) Voume 1 No 3 pages 161-194
7 U  Jürgens  and  J  Rupp,  „The  German  System  of  Corporate  Governance:  Characteristics  and  Changes“, 
Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung Regulierung von Arbeit des Forschungsschwerpunkts Technik, Arbeit, Umwelt 
des Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung No FS1102-203 May 2002 at page 3 of 78
8 J Odenius, „Germany's Corporate Govenance Reforms: Has the System Become Flexible Enough? IMF 2008 
WP/08/179 at page 7 of 21
9 U  Jürgens  and  J  Rupp,  „The  German  System  of  Corporate  Governance:  Characteristics  and  Changes“, 
Veröffentlichungsreihe der Abteilung Regulierung von Arbeit des Forschungsschwerpunkts Technik, Arbeit, Umwelt 
des Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung No FS1102-203 May 2002 at page 3 of 78
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− Responses to product market changes
− Internationalisation of production
In  Germany,  the  corporate  board  is  not  „legally  charged“  with  representing  the  interests  of 
shareholders – rather, it is mandated with looking after interests of stakeholders generally, and not 
just shareholders.10 As well as a two tier board system, comprising the supervisory and management 
boards,  which exists  under the codetermination system, it  is  legally mandated that  workers are 
represented on the supervisory board – a similar situation to that which exists in the U.S where 
some U.S companies  have labour  unions  representatives  on their  boards – although this  is  not 
legally mandated.11 In the UK, based on the Cadbury's Committee's recommendation, many public 
companies voluntarily abide by the Code of Best Practice which recommends that there should be at 
least  three  outside  directors  and  that  the  board  chairman  and  the  CEO  should  be  different 
individuals.
Three Unique Characteristics Peculiar to German System of Corporate Governance
The three pillars on which the „traditional German system of corporate governance“ are considered 
to lie, are as follows:12
− The dominant role of banks in a complex system of cross shareholding and in company 
financing
− The system of industrial co-determination
− The production -oriented, company centred management system
The above mentioned three unique characteristics of the German system of corporate governance, 
are  considered  by  Odenius13 to  contribute  to  difficulties  in  attaining  corporate  governance 
objectives. The problem of  „self dealing“ - „asset diverting behaviour on the part of insiders to the 
detriment  of  outsiders,  typically  minority  shareholders“,  is  also  highlighted.  Furthermore,  high 
ownership concentration and managerial control by insiders are not only considered to encourage 
the rise of risk of managerial fraud, but are also illustrated by way of managerial fraud cases such as 
Parmalat. 
10 C S Eun and BG Resnick, International Financial Management Fifth Edition 2009 at page 84
11 See ibid
12 U Jürgens and J Rupp, „The German System of Corporate Governance: Characteristics and Changes“,at page 7 of 
78
13 See J Odenius, „Ger,many's Corporate Governance Reforms: Has the System Become Flexible Enough?“ July 2008 
IMF WP/08/179 at page 9 of  21
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The above mentioned complexities, complex ownership structures, as well as problems attributed to 
opacity  –  these  arising  from complicated  transparency  and  complex  ownership  structures,  are 
features  which  will  be  demonstrated  in  other  concentrated  ownership  structure  jurisdictions  – 
namely, India and Japan. 
In Germany, share ownership is heavily concentrated – with over half of all shares being owned by 
non financial companies, banks and insurance companies – main motive of shareholding being to 
strengthen long term relationships and business interdepencies, as well as long term committment.14 
According  to  Jürgens  and  Rupp,15 whilst  the  ownership  stake  of  banks  is  substantial,  their 
dominating  role  is  based  less  on  direct  share  ownership  than  a  system  of  proxy  voting 
(Depotstimmrecht) - under which votes are cast for other shareholders.
Effects of Shift Towards Less Domination by Banks and Impact of the Development of Financial 
Markets as Impetus For Changes to Corporate System in Germany
The status of banks as „dominant shareholders (mainly by proxy)“, according to Jürgens and Rupp, 
provides explanation for why bank representatives are prevalent on most companies' supervisory 
boards.16
Effective corporate governance mechanisms is considered to include both:17
− Internal mechanisms such as board of directors and their major committees
− External mechanisms such as hostile takeover bids, leveraged buyouts, proxy contests, legal 
protection  of  minority  shareholders,  the  disciplining  of  managers  in  the  external  labour 
markets
Odenius also adds that external control mechanisms are important complementary mechanisms to 
internal control mechanisms. Leveraged buyouts, as well as hostile take overs are considered to be 
more difficult in environments involving concentrated ownership systems and structures than in 
14 U Jürgens and J Rupp, „The German System of Corporate Governance: Characteristics and Changes“,at page 9 of 
78
15 See ibid at page 10 of 78; it is also added that under this system, private shareholders authorize banks that hold their 
shares (in custody) to represent their interests at the annual general meetings of the companies.
16 Ibid at page 11 of 78; They add furthermore, that the position of banks ws traditionally strengthened as a result of 
their role in business financing and that they also used to be the most important source of outside finance – this 
being the case with other advanced capitalist countries, see ibid  aat page 12 of 78.
17 See P Kaur and S Gill „The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Govenance and Performance: An 
Empirical Assessment in India“ Research Project NFCG 2007-2008 at page 5 of 6
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dispersed ownership systems. For these and other reasons which will be highlighted as follows, the 
dominance  of  banks  on  companies'  supervisory boards,  as  well  as  their  influence  on  minority 
shareholders has constituted the topic of various debates. Opposing views regarding the interests 
and  disadvantages  of  the  „historically  prominent  role  of  banks“  in  the  German  corporate 
governance system are illustrated thus:
− Through their continued presence at shareholders' meetings, banks provide an independent 
outside monitor of corporate decision making. Outside monitoring......... serving to alleviate 
the so called „free rider problem“ which arises whenever many small shareholders have to 
form a common standpoint vis-a-vis top management.18
In opposing the above view, it is further illustrated by Wenger and Kaserer that :19
− In reality, a large number of German banks are sheltered from outside pressures by a dense 
network  of  cross  holdings,  proxy  votes  and  wider  developed  disclosure  obligations. 
Therefore  bank  managers  are  not  forced  to  pursue  value  maximizing  investments  and 
monitoring policies.
Hence opacity is  also a  feature which appears to be prevalent in Germany and such issues of 
opacity will be illustrated in prevailing characteristics which also exist  in India in the next section – 
as well as considered under the ownership structures and systems of governance in Japan. 
As indicated by Odenius, since both stakeholder and shareholder systems should aim to maximize 
flexibility, and observing that both systems have their comparative advantages and specific agency 
risks, „system selection should be left to markets as final arbitrators and therefore the normative 
challenge is to devise regulatory frameworks within which the open competition between different 
forms of ownership strcutures can take place, without distortion.“20
 
18 See U Jürgens and J Rupp, „The German System of Corporate Governance: Characteristics and Changes“,at page 15 
of 78; and particularly OECD, Economic Surveys Germany 1995 at page 96
19 Ibid at page 16 of 78; and particularly E Wenger and C Kaserer (1998): ‘German Banks and Corporate Governance: 
A Critical View’, in K. Hopt, H. Kanda, M. Roe, E. Wymeersch and S. Prigge (eds.) Comparative Corporate 
Governance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research, Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
20 J Odenius, „Germany's Corporate Govenance Reforms: Has the System Become Flexible Enough? IMF 2008 
WP/08/179 at page 6 of 21
8
India
In India, the „traditional culture of big corporate family owned houses“ or blocks of shareholding, 
are considered to prevail.21 Based on evidence from insignificant shareholding of individuals in 
sample companies, Kaur and Gill illustrate how individual shareholders have no incentive and no 
capability to monitor and influence the behaviour of management. They also add that in contrast to 
findings on other emerging economies in Asia, that „affiliations with banks and institutions“ are not 
a prominent feature of Indian corporations.22
Firms which have large controlling shareholders can be distinguished from those of publicly held 
corporations which are so numerous and small that they are unable to effectively control decisions 
of the management team, in the sense that „a large controllng shareholder has both the incentives 
and power to control the management team's actions.“23 According to Srivastava, the main problem 
then becomes controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. Furthermore, he 
adds that holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, will therefore, through:24
− their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors;
−  as well as being able determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on other matters;
be able to acquire immense power to the extent of benefiting themselves at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Gill and Kaur25 also lend their support to this view by stating that one of the major 
governance challenges in India lies with unaddressed conflicts between dominant shareholders and 
minority shareholders. 
Firms with highly concentrated shareholdings are considered more likely to be able to transfer 
business risks to third party insurance companies – as a means of reducing costs. It is argued that 
the role of ownership structures, and particularly concentrated ownership, as means of corporate 
governance measure26 in monitoring management, may constitute the reason why banks may be 
21 P Kaur and S Gill „The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Govenance and Performance: An Empirical 
Assessment in India“ Research Project NFCG 2007-2008 at page 3 of 6
22 Ibid at page 4 of 6
23 A Srivastava, „Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India“ International Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science Volume 1 No 1 January 2011 at page 1 of 7
24 ibid
25 P Kaur and S Gill „The Effects of Ownership Structure on Corporate Govenance and Performance: An Empirical 
Assessment in India“ Research Project NFCG 2007-2008 at page 5 of 6
26 Sarker  adds  that  with  diffuse  ownership structures,  agency problems arise  on  account  of  shareholder  manager 
conflicts (Type 1 or vertical agency problems) whilst with concentrated ownership and control, agency problems 
arise  primarily due  to  conflicts  between  the  two categories  of  principals  –  the  controlling inside  shareholders 
(dominant  shareholders)  and  the  dispersed  minority  outside  shareholders  (this  being  referred  to  as  Type  II  or 
horizontal agency problems). Hence the role of ownership strcuture as a mechanism of corporate governance is 
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more  willing  to  lend,  as  well  as  also  a  reason  for  the  degree  of  ability  by such  concentrated 
ownership firms to obtain property insurance in more debt based lending jurisdictions such as India 
than in the UK and the U.S.27  
Results  of  a  study by Jia,  Adam and Buckle28 highlight  the  fact  that  „firms with more  insider 
ownership, greater leverage, more growth options, more tangible assets and publicly listed firms, 
are more likely to purchase property insurance.
Would this imply that such firms are able to manage their risks more effectively?
Chakrabarti, Megginson and Yadav are cited as highlighting the fact that ownership structure could 
have significant influences on the risk management and internal control decisions of Indian firms.29
Similar views are illustrated30 by Zou and Adams in an analysis which is provided on corporate 
ownership and equity risks in China. Liability insurance, according to Jia, Adams and Buckle,31 are 
not as popular compared with property insurance lines of business, owing to relatively undeveloped 
legal tort systems.
Some of the following are factors, which according to Jia, Adams and Buckle, are considered to be 
influential and beneficial in corporations' decisions to obtain property insurance – particularly in 
India:32
− Insurance serves as a commonly used risk management technique which is important for 
firms  in  developing  countries  because  unanticipated  (uninsured)  losses  can  result  in 
reallocation of resources from those resources for planned long term investment to those 
considered  likely  to  be  alleviated  under  concentrated  ownership  and  control  „since  incentives  of  controlling 
shareholders to monitor management would be stronger on account of their substantial stakes in the corporation.“ It 
is however, further argued that this does not preclude Type II agency problems. See particularly R Morck and B 
Yeung, „Special Issues Relating to Corporate Governance and Family Control“ (2004) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3406 and   J Sarkar, Ownership and Corporate Govenance in Indian Firms at page 220
27 ibid
28 J Jia, M Adams and M Buckle, „Insurance and Ownership Structure in India's Corporate Sector“ July 2009 at page 6 
of 29. They conclude that firms with „high degree of managerial ownership and leverage, plus firms with high 
growth options, high asset  tangibility and public listing status,  are more likely to insure their assets than other 
entities.“
29 See ibid at page 5 of 29. The transfer of of business risk to third party insurance companies as an alternative means 
to risk retention „within an undiversified ownership structure“, is also highlighted.
30 See as cited,  H Zou and MB Adams „Corporate Ownership, Equity Risk and Returns in the People's Republic of 
China Journal of International Business Studies Volume 39, No 7, pages 1149-1168“; ibid
31 Ibid; Sinha cited, see T Sinha, „The Indian Insurance Industry: Challenges and Prospects Swiss Re, Zurich
32 See ibid at pages 2 and 7
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associated for tasks of reconstruction;
− The presence of appropriate levels of property insurance cover allows debtholders' payoffs 
to become relatively independent of project selection and in so doing, limits the ability of 
borrowing firms to shift business risk to debt holders.33
− The ability of insurance to mitigate agency incentive conflicts in firms is expected to be 
particularly important in India where publicly quoted and non quoted companies tend to rely 
heavily on debt financing – particularly from banks (this being also attributed to the fact that 
the issue of public equity is strictly controlled by the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI).
It is also to be added that apart from the complexity of ownership structure, an important source of 
agency costs  in  Indian  listed  companies  which  makes  it  difficult  for  outsiders  to  ascertain  the 
complete chain of ownership and control between firms, is the opacity of ownership structures.34 
Hence the legal and regulatory system in India will have an immense role to play in providing  more 
effective corporate governance mechanisms, as well  as in facilitating economic growth and the 
development of ownership structures and systems in India. Transparency, being a key area to be 
focussed on. In India, the regulatory framework of corporate governance consists of the Companies 
Act, the Listing Agreement,  .the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act 1992, the 
Securities Contracts  (Regulation) Act 1956, Sick Industrial  Companies (Special  Provisions) Act 
1985.
Japan
Dominance of Banks and Barriers to External Corporate Governance Controls
The dominance of banks and financial investors in the Japanese corporate system of governance is 
reflected thus:35
− Results reveal that the equity investments of financial investors (institutional investors and 
banks)  in  Japanese  listed  companies,  were  predominantly  in  high  tech  manufacturing, 
33 Jia, Adams and Buckle also argue further that corporate purchase of property insurance could help mitigate 
borrowers' assets substitution incentives – hence lowering lenders' risk exposures.
34 See J Sarkar, Ownership and Corporate Govenance in Indian Firms at page 236
35 Y Altunbas, A Kara and A van Rixtel, „Corporate Governance and Corporate Ownership: The Investment Behaviour 
of Japanese Institutional Investors“ 2007 Documentos Ocasionales No 0703 Banco de Espana at page 8
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traditional manufacturing and communications industries. All financial investors combined, 
held more than 60% of the equity capital of the firms listed on the Tokyo and Osaka Stock 
Exchanges – with banks being the largest group of such investors.
The  dominance  of  banks  in  concentrated  ownership  structures  and  systems  such as  Japan  and 
Germany  has  already  been  discussed.  It  was  earlier  highlighted  that  concerns  are  directed 
particularly at the level of protection which is afforded to minority shareholders in cases where such 
dominance  prevails.  This  being  particularly  the  case  given  the  rarity  of  external  corporate 
governance measures – such as take-overs.
It is acknowledged that whilst hostile takeovers are rare in Japan, they are common place in the U.S 
and U.K – the role of cross shareholdings as „formidable“ barriers to hostile takeovers in Japan 
being also highlighted.36
Further such flaws attributed to a „lack of market for corporate control“ in Germany and Japan, 
possible  weaknesses  resulting  from financial  banking  institutions  acting  as  outside  monitors  – 
particularly the long-term relationships between banks and those firms they are supposed to be 
monitoring are areas of concern.  Such long term relationships having the tendency to  alter  the 
traditional and assumedly professional principal- agency relationships supposed to exist between 
such banks and their clients. 
Whilst long term relationships definitely foster a better environment to improve communication and 
address agency problems, too much proximity between banks and client firms could also result in 
the abuse of rights of the minority shareholders.
Other institutions for monitoring and disciplining corporate  management  in Japan,  as identified 
include:37
− corporate groups (Keiretsu)
− the „main bank“ system;
− concentrated shareholdings
36 F Allen and M Zhao, „The Corporate Governance Model of Japan: Shareholders are not Rulers“ May 2007 see 
abstract and page 11 
37 See Y Altunbas, A Kara and A van Rixtel, „Corporate Governance and Corporate Ownership: The Investment 
Behaviour of Japanese Institutional Investors“ 2007 Documentos Ocasionales No 0703 Banco de Espana at page 14
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Altunbas, Kara and van Rixtel also refer to results of various studies which highlight the fact that 
financial liberalisation and globalisation – as well as „structural changes in the flow of funds and 
related diversification of the sources of corporate finance“, have undermined the foundation of the 
„main bank“ system.38 The organisation of Keiratsu conglomerates around large commercial banks, 
it  is  further  observed,39 has  been  „significantly  undermined  –  owing  to  revolutionary  merger 
processes in the  Japanese banking industry“ which involved banks that traditionally belonged to 
various Keiratsu.
According to Sakai and Asaoka,40
− Despite  the  progress  of  deregulation  and  market  mechanism,  Japan  is  facing  ongoing 
recessions after the bubble economy. One of the reasons is the malfunctioning corporate 
governance, the demerits of insider type governance as represented by main bank system 
and cross - shareholding, brought to light. Lingering bad debt problems also mean that main 
bank system could not discipline the management any more. Then, why does insider type 
governance does not work well in current Japan?
The reasons, as suggested by them, are, as follows:
− Indirect finance to direct finance by financial deregulation
− Deregulation  of  Japanese  financial  markets,  as  well  as  alternatives  to  bank  debt  have 
become available to large Japanese firms
Financial liberalisation is definitely an obvious response and confirmation to the above suggestions 
– having also considered  other opinions on the topic. However, it would be premature to conclude 
that this constitutes the only reason why the insider type of governance has not been functioning 
well  in  Japan.  Other  possible  considerations  including  dominant  banking  institutions  acting  as 
outside monitors – as well as lack of external corporate governance controls. 
38 Ibid at page 17
39 „With the result that the importance of the Keiratsu has declined: Both as an important feature of Japanese industrial 
structure as well as a corporate governance mechanism“; Ibid 
40 H Sakai and H Asaoka, „The Japanese Corporate Governance System and Firm Performance: Toward Sustainable 
Growth“ Research Center for Policy and Economy, Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc Jan 2003 at page 5 of 28
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Further,  the  shift  in  external  sources  of  funding  „the  replacement  of  bank  loans  with  direct 
borrowing from capital markets, such as bonds and commercial paper“ is highlighted.41  
According to an interim report by the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan,42 the conventional 
Japanese corporate governance model consists of a dual structure composed of:
− The board of directors – which execute functions of strategic decision making
− The board of auditors – which audit management's execution of business activities
Furthermore,  it  is  highlighted  by the  report  that  the  board of  auditors  execute  „ex  post  facto“ 
auditing whilst the board of directors do not have real decision making power – with decisions 
actually being taken by the „management board“ or the management board of directors. It is also 
added that in actual fact, „most members of the board of directors are executive directors selected 
from within the company“ - hence making effective governance difficult to achieve.
In  their  article,43 Allen  and  Zhao  highlight  that  in  contrast  to  the  Anglo-American  system of 
corporate  governance which focuses  on the „narrow goal“  of  ensuring wealth  maximisation of 
shareholders, that the Japanese approach, a focus on a wider range of stakeholders, could be more 
efficient.
Further, they relate the U.K, U.S style of governance and wealth maximisation of shareholders to 
Adam Smith's invisible hand theory44 of the market through which they highlight the point that „if 
firms maximise the wealth of their shareholders and individuals pursue their own interests, then the 
allocation of resources is efficient in the sense that nobody can be made better off without making 
somebody worse off.“45
Allen and Zhao provide further support for the Japanese approach of a broader view and objective46 
41  In their opinion, a diversification of the means of financing has weakened the function of main banks. They also 
add that „banks are becoming less powerful in corporate governance matters in many firms,and at the same timeare 
growing more interested in high share values. As a result, the ability of the Japanese corporate governance system to 
use bank monitoring to reduce the agency costs of debt have fallen and can be expected to continue falling.“ see ibid 
at page 6
42 Corporate Governance Committee , Corporate Forum of Japan, „Corporate Governance Principles: A Japanese View 
(Interim Report) October 1997 at pages 6 and 7 of 13
43 F Allen and M Zhao, „The Corporate Governance Model of Japan: Shareholders are not Rulers“ May 2007 see 
abstract and page 1 of 19
44 A Smith, „An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations“ 1776 Dublin:Whitestone
45 See F Allen and M Zhao, „The Corporate Governance Model of Japan: Shareholders are not Rulers“ May 2007 see 
abstract and pages 2-3 of 19
46 Ibid at page 3
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in focussing on a broader range of shareholders since, in their view, a consideration and application 
of Adam Smith's invisible hand, is more relevant in a world or market without externalities.
Is it really the case then, that a „better allocation of resources can be achieved by firms“ under the 
broader view than is the case where a narrow approach (synonymous with that adopted by Anglo 
American systems) is adopted? Allen and Zhou however, have not taken into consideration other 
costs, demerits and disadvantages arising from complex concentrated structures. 
The  following  section  attempts  to  address  certain  features  and  characteristics  of  dispersed 
ownership structures and systems as well as draw comparisons between the Anglo American system 
of corporate governance and that of Japan.
Dispersed Ownership Systems and Structures
UK and US
It is generally acknowledged that the legal framework for corporate governance in the U.S, U.K, 
Canada  and  other  English  common  law  countries  offer  strong  protection  for  shareholders. 
Differences  in  the  U.S,  UK style  of  corporate  governance  and  that  which  exists  in  Japan are 
highlighted within the following contexts:47 
− Board of Directors
− Executive compensation
− The managerial organization of corporations
− The market for corporate control
− Concentrated holdings and monitoring by financial institutions
In contrast to the Anglo American system of corporate governance, costs of concentrated ownership 
structure systems include:48
− reduced liquidity and higher risks for large shareholders – owing to concentration of their 
investments in one specific company
− A relatively under developed market for corporate control;
47 Ibid at pages 6-7
48 Y Altunbas, A Kara and A van Rixtel, „Corporate Governance and Corporate Ownership: The Investment Behaviour 
of Japanese Institutional Investors“ 2007 Documentos Ocasionales No 0703 Banco de Espana at page 13
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− Risk for small  shareholders that  large shareholders can extract  private benefits  from the 
company
Further, „direct control“ through  debt, takes place through the means of „relationship banking“ 
under concentrated ownership structures.
Board of Directors
Whilst  the  board  of  directors  in  the  UK and the  U.S  are  elected  by shareholders  (such  board 
consisting of outside and inside directors), a distinction between the composition of such boards can 
be made in the sense that in the U.S, a majority are typically from outside the firm, whilst in the 
U.K, a minority are from outside the firm.49 In contrast, the structure of Japanese boards of directors 
is such that shareholders, actually do not have much influence – even though in theory, rights of 
Japanese shareholders are supposed to be greater than those of shareholders in the U.S and the 
U.K.50
A prominent feature of UK codes is illustrated by way of the  „Agency Cost Reducing Measure“ 
whose objective is to increase independence and monitoring ability of Board whilst curtailing the 
powers  of  management  through  the  ending  of  the  CEO duality  characteristic.  In  this  sense,  a 
creation of an outsider director as a Chair is undertaken as substitute for the previous CEO dual 
position which embodied separate roles of Chair and CEO.51
  
D Conclusion: The Role of the External Auditor in Incorporating Beneficial Strategies into  
Business and Management Models
The fact that fraud cases are probably more reported in the U.S than (certain) other jurisdictions 
should rather, provide some encouragement that there is greater level of transparency and disclosure 
in operation than is the case with jurisdictions where less transparency and less effective corporate 
governance mechanisms are in operation.
49 F Allen and M Zhao, „The Corporate Governance Model of Japan: Shareholders are not Rulers“ May 2007 see 
abstract and page 7
50 It is also highlighted that over the years, the size of boards have been reformed to bring them in line with UK and 
U.S boards; See ibid
51 See P Burton, „Antecedents and Consequences of Corporate Govenance Structures“ Corporate Governance Volume 
8 No 3 July 2000 at page 196
16
It is certainly the case that less or limited roles exist for external auditors in particular jurisdictions 
than others. This is certainly the case with China where it is observed by certain academics that the 
institutional background in China is different from western countries, such as "flight from audit 
quality" in Defond et al. (2000). Furthermore, it is argued that Chinese companies may not have the 
demand for high audit quality, which may lead to a different role played by external auditors in 
China.  However,  China  is  certainly doing its  best  to  adopt  Basel  rules  –  particularly Basel  III 
regulations in a timely manner and fashion and it will be interesting to see how other aspects of 
Basel  rules  and  regulations  impact  on  the  levels  of  disclosure  and  transparency  in  financial 
regulation – both as regards the structure, systems ad framework.
And whilst a  change from insider type governance (concentrated ownership structures) to outsider 
type governance (dispersed ownership) may be generally advocated in certain jurisdictions, as 
rightly observed, by Sakai and Asaoka,52
− it  should be noted that institutional  complementarities exist among the Japanese corporate 
governance system, including main bank system and cross share -holding,  labor system, 
business  transaction system, financial  system, and legal  system.  Because of  institutional 
complementarities  among the  systems,  changing the  corporate  governance  system  alone 
would likely yield an undesired outcome.“
52 H Sakai and H Asaoka, „The Japanese Corporate Governance System and Firm Performance: Toward Sustainable 
Growth“ Research Center for Policy and Economy, Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc Jan 2003 at pages 6-7 of 28
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